




A behavioral cost-benefit approach to the explanation and prediction of behavior





Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Verhallen, T. M. M., & van Raaij, W. F. (1985). A behavioral cost-benefit approach to the explanation and
prediction of behavior. In H. Brandstätter, & E. Kirchler (Eds.), Economic psychology: Proceedings of the 10th
IAREP Annual Colloquium, Linz, 1985 (pp. 37-53). (Reihe sozialwissenschaftliche Materialien; No. 8). Trauner.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
ERASMUS UNIVERSITEIT ROTTERDAM
Department of Economics




ON ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY, Number 37
A J&EHAVIOKAk COST-BENEFIT APPROACH TO THE
AND PREDICTION OF BEHAVIOR
Onlverslty and
Erasmus University:, Itdtterdaii




A BEHAVIORAL COST-BENEFIT APPROACH
TO THE EXPLANATION AND PREDICTION
OF BEHAVIOR
Theo M.M. Verhallen
and W, Fred van Raalj
Abstract
Psychological models of explaining and predicting behavior use the construct of
attitude, whereas In economic models, assuming stable preferences, behavior is
determined by budget constraints. In this article, a behavioral cost-benefit to
the explanation and prediction of behavior Is proposed. Behavioral costs Include
financial, temporal, physical, and social costs of initiating, maintaining and
changing behavior. A behavioral model is proposed, in which cost-benefit
tradeoffs of behaviors play a central role.
Introduction
Psychology, as the science of human behavior, is largely preoccupied with
motivational constructs to describe, to explain, and to predict the behavior of
individuals and small groups. These are two main aspects of motivated behavior:
First the energizing or activating aspect, and second the directional aspect.
Motivational activation produces a state of readiness for behavior (arousal). In
addition to producing a state of readiness for behavior, an activated motive
also tends to set off behavior in a particular direction.
Simple reflex behavior Is not usually thought of as motivated behavior, although
even such reflex behavior such as the heartbeat and digestion serve purposes In
the life of the organism, and are responsive to various kinds of motivational
activation.
In several psychological models motivation is treated as an unrestricted
behavioral tendency towards goals* In the Fishbein-Ajzen (1975) attitude model
only unfavorably evaluated beliefs may serve as restrictions to behavior. For
instance, predicting purchasing behavior, an unfavorably evaluated price may be
a restriction to buy a product with favorably evaluated characteristics.
However, as a consequence of the linear-compensatory combination rule of the
Fishbeln-Ajzen model, an unfavorably evaluated price may be compensated by the
favorably evaluated beliefs/attributes of the product, or the beliefs about the
consequences of buying/possessing the product*
Economics, as the science of the allocation and usage of scarce resources, is
largely preoccupied with restrictions due to limited resources. Preferences are
considered to be stable, and behavior Is explained by utility maximization
within budget constraints* In most economic models, only financial budgets are
considered, although time budgets (Becker, 1976) and physical (health) budgets
(Lesourne, 1979) appear in some economic models. In economic models the
financial and other constraints determine behavior, only within a budget some
freedom of choice may exist.
Meyer (1982), an economist addressing the attitude-behavior relationship,
observes that attitude measurement does not include the relevant opportunity
costs Of an act, consequently, cannot be used as a reliable predictor of
behavior.
In this article, a theoretical model of behavior will be presented, extending
the Flshbeln-Ajzen model of reasoned action. Special attention will be given to
the "two-valued logic" of micro-economics, comprising the (positive) outcomes or
consequences of behavior, as well as the (negative) behavioral costs that have
to be incurred by the Individual in order to behave.
Toward a behavioral model
Both in psychology and in economics, models have been developed to describe, to
explain and to predict behavior or specific forms of behavior, e.g. consumer
behavior. The behavioral model we want to introduce, is a combination of the
extended attitude-behavior model and a utility model. We depart from the
Fishbeln-AJzen (1975) model of reasoned action* This model will be critically
evaluated and some extensions will be introduced. Then, departing from the
micro-economic approach, utility models and a behavioral extension of the
economic cost concept will be discussed* Finally, we hope to integrate both
approaches. *
Fishbeln and Ajzen's model has the purpose of contributing to the understanding
and prediction of behavior. It can be represented in the form of three formulas
(Fishbeln and Ajzen, 1975): ^
(1) B ~* BI - WJL (Aact) + W2 (SN)
(2)
*
In the model it 1$ supposed that the Intention (Bt) to perform a certain
behavior (B) is a function of the weighted (wj) attitude (Fishbeln and Ajzen
define attitude as affect) toward performing a behavior (Aact) and the weighted
(wjj> Subjective Norm ($8) (Formula 1)* A behavioral Intention is seen as
consisting of a personal and a social component*
The attitude toward & behavior Is a function of the expected consequences or
t̂tt̂ S«̂ ^̂ |̂«̂ t̂̂ t̂t«i|r * fcj) and th« «v4luatlons of these expected
consequence or outcomes (e1) (Formula 2).
The Subjective Norm In the model Is a function of social norms to perform a
behavior (nbj) and the motivation to comply with these noffes (me..) (Formula 3).
If no unanticipated circumstances occur, a behavioral Intention will be
converted Into the corresponding behavior.
In the manifold applications of the model convincing evidence is provided of the
predictive and explanatory power of the model (See for a review Ajzen and
Fishbein, 1980)* Several issues with regard to the application of the model have
been raised: problems with regard to theoretical assumptions underlying the
model, operationalization problems with concepts In the model and a number of
analytical problems*
Extensions of the Fishbeln-Ajzen model
In the Fishbein-AJzen (1975) attitude model it is assumed that the attitude
toward the act precedes the performance of the act* However, Bern (1967, 1972),
in his self-perception theory, proposed the reversed order* attitudes following
behavior* Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) state that past behavior can only influence
future behavior through the beliefs or the motivation to comply, Bentler and
Speckart (1979) and Bagozzi (1981a, 1981b, 1982) demonstrate that this
assumption is Incorrect. Van Raaij and Verhallen (1983a) argue that behavior may
be Induced by attitudes and that through feedback attitudes may change as a
consequence of behavior (See Figure 1).
Figure 1 about here
Three types of feedback effects are distinguished (Van Raaij and Verhallen,
1903a>:
(1) Internalization* According to Bern's (1967) self-perception theory, persons
adapt their attitudes in such a way that these become consonant with their
behavior. The formation and change may occur through a process of
internalizatlon or self-perception.
(2) Learning. From their behavior persons may learn the consequences, ind change
their evaluative beliefs accordingly. They may also learn to relate certain
consequences of behavior to general attitudes* Changes in relational beliefs
(Fishbein, 1967) may occur.
(3) Habit formation* By performing behavior people may establish new pattern of
behavior that, one« they are formed, are repeated over time, and remain to be
























I. three feedback mechanisms.
In the behavioral model of Van Raaij and Verhallen (1983a) the attitude-behavior
or behavior-attitude discussion is "solved" by allowing both orders to exist. In
an longitudinal study on the separation of household waste, Pieters and
Verhallen (1985) find that separate beliefs are better predictors of behavior
than a joint attitude measure, if behavior is just learned. Later in the
process, an overall attitude measure was shown to be a better predictor of
behavior* An explanation is that attitudes are being formed over time based on
behavioral experiences. The order relationship is In fact a circular, reciprocal
one*
Non-intentional behavior
The Fishbein-Ajzen (1975) attitude model only attempts to predict and to explain
intentional behavior under volitional control. They refer to their model as to
a theory of reasoned action (Ajezen and Flshbein, 1980). However, not all
behavior is intentional. Some authors include "other variables' in their
attitude-behavior model. Sheth (1974) adds a separate habit-controlled
mechanism. Van Raaij and Verhallen (1983a) distinguish sltuational and
behavioral contingencies to explain energy conservation behavior (Figure 2).
Figure 2 about here
In Figure 2, it is shown that behavior, as reasoned action, can be determined by
attitudes, influenced by life-style (values and established behavioral
patterns); and by the social and physical situation. Verhallen and De Nooij
(1982) show that specific store choices for daily shopping can be understand
form the perspective of store patronage, as part of a shopping pattern. Oppedijk
van Veen and Verhallen (1984) demonstrate that specific vacation activities can
be part of different vacation styles or patterns. Specific acts can be
understood and predicted from the behavioral context, they arc part of (Van
Raaij and Verhallen, 1983b). The situation has also a direct effect on behavior,
in the sense that people are constrained by physical, temporal, Institutional,
spatial, social and financial factors. Anticipated situations are another
determinant. For instance, people may anticipate the formality of a situation
and dress accordingly. Sarver (1983) argues that a "context of opportunity* Is a
necessary requirement for an attitude and its corresponding behavioral Intention
to be expressed in overt behavior. We may also argue that a given situation may
facilitate or even trigger a certain behavioral response. Some authors (e.g.,
Dawes, 1975, and Foxall, 1984) even argue that most behavior Is adapted to or





Factors moderating the attitude-behavior relationship.
Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) describe the conditions for the^-observation of a
significant relationship of attitudes and behavior* Attitudes and behavioral
entities consist of four elements: (1) the action, (2) the target at which the
action is directed, (3) the context in which the action is to be performed and
(4) the point in time when the action is performed* The content of these
elements might be either general of specific. A significant relationship
between attitude and behavior cannot be observed, unless both the attitude and
the behavioral entity correspond with regard to those four elements.
By specifying the four behavioral elements (action, target, context and time) a
maximum correspondence is achieved between attitudes and actions. Disturbing
factors in the attitude-behavior relationship are defined in such a specific way
that the amount of overlap between the mental and the corresponding behavioral
level is minimized. In this way, as soon as an aspect of the context changes,
the attitude may not be relevant anymore* The generality, stability and the
enduring character of the attitude concept Is sacrificed in order to gain
predictive power.
An other aspect of the attitude-act specification requirements should be
mentioned. If we have to measure an attitude for each of the thousands of acts
(see Barker^ 1980) ah individual performs each day, we should be endlessly
repeating attitude-act studies, every time with a somewhat different act.
Olshavsky (1982) criticizes such an approach of Warshaw (I960) ,
Further* ;it ̂ia questionable whether such s specific act is still an object of
-:i:%iijttaii ̂d;ip«a8-oft|.ng;t:.̂ For';:':Cxattple Ehrenberg (1974 ) and Las tovicka and Bonf ie Id (1 982 )
ĵ  trand at|ittt̂ ŝ in niany ins tances * •. .
more enduring
^̂  l;̂ d̂ 2̂ e should def ine larger behavioral
and Newman,
°r broadening the attitude measure (Heberlein and Black , 1976 ).
It has also been argued that the study of attitudes should encompass both
specific as well as general measures. "Both specific and general attitudes ought
to be included in a study to predict^ behavior, and the entire causal model form
general attitudes to specif ic attitudes to behavior ought to be charted"
(Heberlein and B
. •. :.'.:-" '••''••• : •,'•'- '-•:•' • . ; < :-' '•''.••": .;.:"'/.''.'--:-- : ''-•'''". -- :"-" • v" ' , . .',.'•' ;: •: /' '^>$^-r ''• -'-':'.^.v . - ' - ' • ' .'• • ' "In the behaviorat mo4el of Van Raalj an4 Vcrlî  lien both specif Ic and general
attitudeg [ ̂ re r^resented* Just Ifylng this inclusion they mention (Van Raal j and
Verhallen, 1983â  |>* 52): "general attitudes may provide a general context
shaping more apeciJUe and critical factors**i
Relating general attitudes to specific behavior leads to the Inclusion of
intervening factors that specify the attitude-behavior relationship (Verhallen
and Meters, 1984). In Van Raaij and Verhallen (1983a) four Intervening factors
between attitude and behavior are postulated (Figure 3). Modifying Schwartz's
(1970, 1975) theory of the activation of moral norms, the factors "acceptance of
responsibility" and "perceived effectiveness" are included, In order to relate
general attitudes to specific behavior* Van Raalj and Verhallen (1983a) add the
factors "relational knowledge" and "cost-benefit tradeoff •
Figure 3 about here
Acceptance of responsibility is the attribution of responsibility for the
behavior to oneself* Consumers may have a nagatlve attitude towards
environmental pollution, but may blamf others (industry, government,
agriculture) for polluting the environment* Denying one's responsibility means
that there is no need to change one's behavior.
Perceived effectiveness of one's j^ehavlor refers to the personal efficacy one
perceives* The Effects of behaviors should exceed a threshold of effectiveness
to be performed* This may point to a conjunctive decision rule: Acceptable
behaviors are befrhviors with a minimal level of perceived effectiveness.
Relational knowledge is i$« knowledge of the costs and benefits of the
JN̂ *$fc$fti. ̂ItiittftttvW* JM*H6g* £* m*fa& to accept responsibility, to judge
t&* l*ff*&*** 4lJN̂ ivMta»r***f ******* «*ft̂ lMnDtffte tradeoffs* Knowledge it
defined as the sum of relational descriptive beliefs (Fishbein, 1967). This
means that an individual knows that the act belongs to a behavioral -category,
lie. the set of acts that have a common goal or valued end state (Ajzen an<
Fishbein, 1980)* Verhallen and Pieters (1984) define a behavioral field as the
s*et of instrumental acts that lead to the same goal* These acts are more or less
substitutable.
In the eott~frenelit t radeoff| the costs and benefits of the Instrumental acts








Figure 3. Intervening factors in the attitude-behavior relationship.
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Figure 4 . Ittdi f £eiren ce .curves and budg€» t lines.
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In economic models, price Is not simply a product attribute, but price is traded
off against other product attributes, such as quality. However, one should
distinguish price and coat; cost being the ratio of price and budget: cost »
Pr*ce/budget* Thia means that the price of a product or service will be traded
off against the product attributes (quality)* The costs, however, take away part
of one's budget. It is likely that the costs of expenditures will be compared on
a generic level, i.e. the costs of a vacation versus the costs of a new washing
machine* Individuals differ with regard to their budgets, based on income
differences and on product involvement* For someone, a vacation is very
important and, consequently, a relatively large budget will be seen as a generic
choice between product/service categories or between behavioral fields, whereas
specific choice is the choice between alternatives or instrumental acts with a
category or behavioral field.
Behavioral benefits and goals*
The definition of behavior in psychological and economic models has received
less attention than the definition of the constructs determining behavior*
"»&Verhallen and Tieters (1984) distinguish goal acts and instrumenta1 acts* Goal
acts or consummatory responses are defined as acts, which by performing lead to
a state of the or&a»is« which is desirable for the actor and which makes that
^ the goal ceasea to exist. Pure consumption is such a goal act* Instrumental acts
„. are acts that bring the person in the direction of a goal* In many instances,
*̂iflŴ *̂ %W *~<JNJ$J £f|we## a number of instrumental acts* For instance, to get
f jtĵ ll̂ f ̂fyf̂ f̂ĵ QNi »̂ r *f|*ce,f ft*!** *mit*t4m*at*l acts* *«cH as
letil£g* tti# set of instrumental acts leading to the
state (eituiHnallty) ia called a behavioral field t
Acts or behaviors are evaluated in terms of the degree, in which they lead to
the goal* Instrumental acts that will bring you closer to the goal, will be
preferred, unless the costs are too high. Instrumental acts are substitute ways
of reaching a goal* Selecting one instrumental act reduces the necessity to
another instrumental act, because they constitute Independent ways In the
act8 mav be complementary <ss well; one
another instrumental act to reach a goal
In a sequential manner, one instrumental act may be
umental act to reach a goal.
Acts will be thus chosen based on their instrumentality of reaching the goal.
Goals may be stated in terms of a desired financial, social, physical status,
self-realization, or in terms of possessions. Terminal goals may be too far away
to reach; thus realistic subgoals might be stated. Atkinson (1957) argue that
"achievers" set a realistic goal to reach and select instrumental acts to attain
the goal. The attainment of goals that are too easy or too difficult, do not
lead to an internal but to an external attribution. Everyone resp. no one could
reach that goal. Attaining goals of an intermediate level of difficulty leads to
an internal attribution: Through one's capability and effort, the goal has been
attained. A stable Internal attribution (capability) Is predictive to future
successes. An unstable internal attribution (effort) is less predictive, only if
enough effort will be spent one may be successful. Most achievement behavior,
however, is a combination of capability and effort (Van Raaij, 1985).
Behavioral costs.
Instrumental acts are characterized by benefits and costs. The costs are
financial, social, physical, psychic, and time costs involved in pursuing the
instrumental act. Social costs comprise compliance, instrumental services and
acceptance (Blau, 1964). Individuals have money and time budgets and limited
physical resources to pursue an instrumental act. The behavioral costs of an
instrumental act are the money, time and physical energy spent on the act. For
instance, a shopping trip takes time, effort, and money to be successful.
Substitutions are many. One may save money by spending time and effort
(do-it-yourself products), one may save time by spending money (frozen dinners),
or one may save effort by spending money (delivery service). It depends on one's
budgets, how much money, time, and effort one could spend on an instrumental
act.
The behavioral costs (BC) are the summation of the ratio's of the prices and the
budgets:
BC-FP
FB TB PB SB BB
.;'̂ '?5 :̂:-'̂ -1;:̂ -̂**;̂ ;*̂ :-̂
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are often overlooked, they should be added to the behavioral costs of an
instrumental act (Meyer, 1982), -V.
Sunk coats (Thaler, 1980) imply that paying for the right to use a good or
service will increase the rate at which the good will be utilized* Historical
costs matter and not only incremental costs and benefits affect decisions*
Dramatic examples are the constructions of the Oosterschelde-dam and the nuclear
reactor of Kalkar; their Immense sunk costs are a major incentive to complete
these constructions« Aronson and Mills (1959) studied the effect of the degree
of effort (behavioral cost) on the evaluation of group membership* The severe
initiation group enjoyed group membership better than a control group. Money,
time and effort spent In the past are a major determinant to continue and to
enjoy the consequent behavior. Sivacek and Crano's (1982) concept of "vested
interest" is a social analogon of sunk costs*
Cost-benefit tradeoffs*
Stating a goal and trying to attain this goal through instrumental acts requires
a tradeoir" between tĥ ^̂  acts.
Thiŝ  Is certainly not new* Clawson (1950) already applied Lewln's field or
topolbgical theory to consumer behavior•the twislc concept in Clawson1s model is
that consumer behavior Is governed by the outcome of an internal psychological
4ĉ  ̂î  {iositlvfe an̂  negative aspects, called
is
£• incLewln's- field theory,
-•
^ to be .̂ impleme n t ed In
level.
the thermos tat ,
Closing curtains, insulating the home* install in more efficient heating
system, wearing a jersey or a sweater, etc* JEach of these instrumental behaviors
ĥ ŝ  its own costs and 1>̂  but at high
^ Persons
will select that ̂  cost-benefit
>;̂ ^ ,';.;.• /• . .
;sta"tes^;';t^at:^^^ .as .. • • •"• ' . , • •
:-intrl,nsicr. o r : /
\ •':•' ••:.. , ; -v ' ' ; : : ' ; " . / - ' - ' : ^ ; ; . -.-. . • ' - ' ->•"• '-'"•">•;••:'! •^•••:- ' •••;• '• ' • : ' . ; : : ^ ' . ; : - : . . ' - : • • . ' : ''•<-.• !--'^~'.3i$$fc:^-:. . : V V - : . : •^•^:^'(-::\'-'f"^.:\i-' "'•^••:- ' ::."' " ,- • ' , ' ' • • ' . . . ' : , . • • • - . : '^ ' ; ' '
urti lateral social l|iiiard.lnd
or ̂ r e w a r d s * Again, socrlal cost Is the ratio o^r^^
-I?-
Many behaviors are at once desirable (benefits) and undesirable (costs). You
like candy, but you do not want to get fat* The costs and benefits may be about
equal and create an "approach-avoidance conflict". A child enjoys school, but
looks forward to vacation; his or her attitude towards school is ambivalent* A
goal that is at once attractive and dangerous results in vacillation* The
dangers (costs) seems less real when the goal is at a distance, so that the
inviting character (benefits) leads to approach behavior. But the sense of
danger increases as the goal is approached, so that nearer to the goal one has a
tendency to withdraw* Both opposing tendencies lead to a point near enough to
the goal for one to be aware of the dangers, but distant enough to be safe from
them (Brown, 1948 and Miller, 1959). Both tendencies can be depicted as approach
and avoidance gradients; benefits and costs, respectively.
Positive Investment behavior occurs,*when the behavioral costs are "paid" at
time t|, whereas the benefits come at a later point in time t2> e.g. preventive
health care. Negative investment behavior occurs, when the benefits come at time
t£, and the costs at a later time t>>> e*&* drinking and smoking* It depends on
one's time perspective, whether n̂e engages in negative or positive investment
behavior. Future costs and benefits may be discounted and have to be higher than
present-time costs and benefits (cf. Interest rate).
<*
Behaviors way bring benefits for oneself, but costs (̂ 'external costs") for
, e»g* * noisy party* Altruistic* behavior brings costs to oneself, but
to others, although it amy be argued that altruistic behavior* e.g.
gift giving* brings social benefits to a person to offset the financial costs.
Behaviors that result in short-term personal benefits, but long-term societal
costs (external effects) c*it»£it«te a "social trapn (Platt, 1973). People tend
to engage iti these behaviors, e.g. behaviors with negative environmental X*
consequences such as car driving, without being aware of the long-term societal
costs, e.g. acid rain.
Another distinction that should ne made, is the distinction between engaging a
behavior <initiation) versus maintaining a behavior. Different costs and
benefits may be involved In a behavioral change and in maintaining a behavior.
Behavioral change involves opportunity costs of forgoing the alternative, costs
of learning the new behavior Includes habit information, forgetting about
alternatives and positive feedback information about the behavior. Sunk costs
ttay bt Ji iajor reason why people continue their behavior, as well as the high
«!% behavior*
Pieters, Verhallen and De Jong (1985), in a longitudinal design study household
participation in waste separation. Behavioral costs and benefits are the major
determinants of the intention to participate at the start of the program
(behavioral initiation). Maintaining the behavior is mainly determined by an
attitude measure that Integrates the behavioral costs and benefits (Figure 6),
Figure 6 about here
A model of behavior*
Van Raaij and Verhallen (1983a) developed a model of energy behavior, which can
easily be generalized to a general model of behavior (Figure 7). Behavioral
initiation, maintenance and change, are types of instrumental behaviors toward a
particular goal* The evaluation of behavior is the degree to which the behavior
brings one closer to the goal. Factors intervening between general intentions
and specific intentions are acceptance of responsibility, perceived effective-
ness, relational knowledge, and, most importantly, cost-benefit tradeoffs*
Knowledge about the costs and benefits of instrumental behaviors Is influenced
by specific information and by learning through feedback.
Figure 7 about here
The behavioral model contains five ways to affect the behavior for public policy
(circles in the model): (1) general information, (2) specific information, (3)
subsidies and prices (4) three types of feedback, and (5) requirements and
regulation approaches* It is predicted that specific information is more
effective in influencing behavior than general information, because of the fact
that specific information may directly influence the cost-benefit tradeoffs of
the instrumental costs. General Information may, however, be needed to justify
public policy measures. Prices and subsidies change the costs of Instrumental
acts and, thus, make these more or less attractive (e.g. merit goods). The fifth
public policy approach is to restrict the contingencies, so that undesirable
behaviors cannot be pursued or are made more difficult to pursue, e.g.
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A general model of the determinants of behavior.
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